Deep Sea Foreign Transportation of Freight

SIC 4412

Companies in this industry

Industry report:

This category includes companies primarily engaged in operating vessels for the transportation of freight on the deep seas between the United States and foreign ports. Establishments operating vessels for the transportation of freight that travel to foreign ports and also to noncontiguous territories are included in this industry. A related industry group is SIC 4424: Deep Sea Domestic Transportation of Freight.

Industry Snapshot

Deep sea foreign transportation of freight is greatly influenced by the global economy and international competition. U.S. companies in this industry compete with each other and with foreign carriers. U.S. regulations have tended to make costs higher for U.S. ship owners than for those ships bearing the flags of other nations. To stay competitive in the cargo transport business, many U.S.-owned ships carry flags of nations with lower expenses. By operating under the authority of other countries, labor costs for U.S. shipping operations could be cut as much as 80 percent.

Although tonnage of foreign merchandise trade increased in the early twenty-first century, rising costs and price competition continued to mean declining profits for U.S. ship owners. Some shipping firms received subsidies from the U.S. government to compensate for high U.S. flag operating costs. These subsidies fell under the Maritime Security Program that would make steamships available to the U.S. Defense Department should the need arise. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, total revenues in the deep sea freight transportation industry reached $9.6 billion in 2009, and the U.S. Transportation Institute estimated that by the early 2010s, 1.3 billion metric tons of cargo were being moved by ship annually.

The outlook for the U.S. flag fleet was predicated on several factors, including foreign competitors; costs of labor, fuel, insurance, and other operating expenses; and volume of trade in relation to available cargo space. Overcapacity has been a problem for U.S. and foreign merchant fleets for many years, resulting in lower freight rates. However, an ever-increasing globalization of the marketplace led to growing demand for freight-bearing vessels during the first decade of the 2000s and early 2010s, especially for transporting exports from Asia to the United States.

Organization and Structure

The U.S. merchant deep sea fleet is made up of three categories of service: liner, non-liner (or tramp), and tanker.

Liner service includes regular, scheduled stops at ports along a route. Vessels operating as liners may be owned or chartered by an operator. Operators must accept any legal cargo they are equipped to carry, unless it does not meet the minimum freight requirements of the operator. Liner service usually carries manufactured goods. Often, two or more carriers along a route form "conferences" in order to regulate rates and competition. All conference members must charge the same freight rates, although rates may fluctuate according to supply and demand for cargo space. Liner service vessels are designed to handle the cargo most often shipped along their routes. Trip frequency depends upon the demands for shipping along that route.

Non-liner, or tramp, shipping is scheduled individually by a customer who charters the ship to carry its cargo. Tramps usually carry only one type of bulk cargo, such as coal, ores, grain, lumber, or sugar. On occasion, two shippers of the same commodity may charter the ship jointly. Freight rates vary depending on the negotiations of the ship owner and shipper and the supply of and demand for cargo space. The tramp freight market peaked in 1995 and continued to decline except for a few peak rate periods.

Tankers carry liquid cargoes, especially crude oil and petroleum products. Tankers may be operated by privately owned companies for charter or by the oil company or other company as part of its entire industrial organization. Oil companies also charter extra ships as needed. However, they are not the only ones to employ ships exclusively for their own trade. Other companies may have specialized ships for transport of their goods. For instance, produce growing and distributing concerns operate fleets of refrigerated vessels for transportation purposes.

Some companies chartered ships on a long-term basis. Doing so provided many of the same advantages of owning a fleet without the enormous investment. By owning a fleet or contracting for long-term charter, the shipper was able to maintain complete control over shipping schedules. It could divert its ships to ports where demand for the product was high, and it could engage for service a fleet of ships with crews that had experience in handling a particular commodity.

Ships became increasingly more specialized during the twentieth century, and specialized ships were built to carry such diverse products as bulk cement, liquid chemicals, coal, iron ore, liquefied natural gas, newsprint and other paper products, petroleum and petroleum products, wood chips and wood pulp, refrigerated foods, and heavy equipment like railroad locomotives or electric generator parts. Because many specialized ships were expensive to build, a ship owner could agree to have a ship built for a company with the stipulation that the company agree to lease the ship for most of its active life.

There were several federal agencies that administered laws and policies concerning the U.S. merchant fleet. The main agency was the U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration (MARAD), which was charged with coordinating the requirements of ship owners, shipbuilders, shippers, and labor unions for both domestic and foreign trade. In the late twentieth century, MARAD initiated and administered construction and operating subsidies, capital construction funds, and market development and maritime training.

Background and Development

Since the earliest days of the business in the United States, the federal government has considered the maintenance of a viable merchant fleet to be a priority for national security and the health of foreign trade. During wars and other emergencies, the U.S. military chartered private ships to transport supplies.

Congressional legislation throughout U.S. history has helped to protect and promote the U.S. merchant fleet. Legislation in 1845 required the U.S. Postal Service to transport mail abroad on U.S. merchant ships. Mail contracts were offered as incentives for shipping companies to establish shipping lines with Cuba, Panama, and major European ports. The law also stipulated that merchant ships could be converted to warships if necessary. The Military Transportation Act, passed in 1904, directed the U.S. Army and Navy to give preference to U.S. flagships for the transportation of supplies for direct support of military operations abroad.

The Merchant Marine Act of 1928 offered incentives to the shipbuilding industry to build new ships so U.S. fleets could compete more effectively in the world market. This legislation, however, failed to spur the construction of many new ships, and U.S. foreign shipping continued to decline as it had for many years.

The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 has been called the Magna Carta for U.S. shipping. It called for the first direct aid to merchant fleets for construction and operation. It also authorized the government to build ships and charter them to private companies for operation on foreign routes if private citizens did not provide that service. It required subsidized fleets to set up special funds to replace aging ships, provided loans and mortgage insurance, and authorized a training program for U.S. crew members. The landmark legislation was followed in 1954 by the "Fifty-Fifty Law," which required that at least half of the country's foreign aid or humanitarian aid cargoes be carried abroad by U.S. merchant ships.

A weak merchant marine was regarded as unacceptable to the U.S. Department of Defense, as the military has historically relied on private ships to carry military cargo during emergencies. Although all U.S. presidents since George Washington have recognized the importance of a strong merchant marine for the nation's security, the industry has not always received the support it needed to remain viable and to compete successfully with foreign ship operators. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton promised reform in order to maintain the shrinking U.S. merchant fleet, which carried only about 15 percent of U.S. exports in the early 1990s, according to The Wall Street Journal. The National Performance Review headed by former Vice President Al Gore made several reform recommendations regarding the maritime industry, including striking down legislation that forced U.S. flag ships to carry military and aid cargoes, curtailing subsidies, repealing antitrust protection for carrier conferences established under the 1984 Shipping Act, and extending the U.S. flag to carrier lines that had foreign investors.

The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 was an attempt to counter several growing problems in the shipping industry. The U.S. fleet at that time carried only a small portion of the nation's foreign trade, and a large portion of its ships were due to be scrapped because of age within the next few years. The 1970 legislation called for the construction of 300 merchant ships, deferred taxes for U.S. shipping companies if the money was put into funds to replace aging vessels, and provided operating and construction subsidies.

Despite the best intentions and stated policies of the U.S. government, U.S. companies engaged in foreign deep sea transportation have been in trouble for many years. Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, the 1990-1991 confrontation with Iraq over its invasion of Kuwait, required a gigantic shipping effort to bring U.S. supplies and equipment to the Middle East. The military enlisted the services of the merchant marine for this task. It also used several dozen chartered transport ships it kept fully loaded and ready. However, even these privately owned ships could not handle the demand of military shipments, and the United States was forced to turn to foreign transport to carry equipment and supplies. During the build-up of forces, almost half of the 200 ships carrying equipment to Saudi Arabia were foreign-owned. This dependence on foreign vessels was partially a consequence of the U.S. fleet's incompatibility with military needs. The U.S. military needed Ro/Ro (roll on/roll off) ships for ease of transport, but Fortune magazine asserted that half the U.S. fleet consisted of oil tankers and the rest were containerships or bulk carriers. Fortune also noted that although ships were much larger than in 1950, the U.S. shipping capacity had decreased a third since then.

Like the rest of the world's fleets, U.S. bulk carriers and supertankers were aged and worn. However, replacing them was expensive, and the perennially shaky financial standing of the industry left it unable to afford replacements. After years of debate, the U.S. Congress finally passed the Maritime Security Act in 1996 by an overwhelming margin. The Act reformed outdated maritime regulations and ensured that privately owned merchant ships would be available to meet national security sealift requirements. It also established a program to provide participating carriers with $1 billion in operating assistance over 10 years.

Prior to passage of the Act, the two largest U.S. shipping companies, American President Companies and CSX Corporation's Sea-Land Service, Inc., considered registering their fleets overseas and flying the flag of another nation unless the United States relaxed its rules and regulations, which ship owners regarded as prohibitively expensive. One of those restrictive rules stated that shipping lines must buy ships built in the United States in order to receive operating subsidies. John Lillie, president of the American President Lines Ltd. (APL), said that ship lines needed to have more freedom to buy vessels overseas because of the lower costs of those products.

Despite threats that even surpassed the passage of the Maritime Security Act, in January 1997, APL chose to remain a U.S. flag carrier, retaining at least a 51 percent U.S. ownership, by enrolling nine of its largest ships in the Maritime Security Program in return for $2.1 million per ship in annual subsidies for $18.9 million. Its other 38 vessels were enrolled in December 1996. Nevertheless, APL Limited announced in April 1997 that it was merging with Neptune Orient Lines LTD, a Singapore-owned and operated steamship line. Sea-Land Services, Inc., also applied to the Maritime Security Program. The U.S. government accepted 15 of its ships in return for $2.1 million per year for each ship participating in the program.

Legislation to deregulate the ocean shipping industry continued to be debated in Congress after the National Industrial Transportation League proposed the issue in January 1995. Such reform would enable shippers to operate in a more certain regulatory environment and, according to steamship lines, would improve shipper-carrier relations and the efficiency of U.S. exporters, as well as reduce the federal government's involvement in unnecessary regulation.

In March 1997, legislation to allow confidential contracting between individual ocean common carriers and shippers, along with measures like publicizing tariffs and the reducing the time required to post tariff rate increases, were proposed to change the Shipping Act of 1984. Called the Ocean Shipping Reform Act, the bill essentially eliminated the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) and transferred its functions to an expanded and renamed took effect in 1998 with the FMC eliminated in 1999.

Tankers and Oil Spill Legislation.
Transport of oil in bulk began in the late 1880s. Tankers in the more than 100 years since then have changed dramatically, with ship work handled more by computers, cutting the size of the crew. The enormous size of the tankers of the modern era has also increased the risk of oil spills and the impact such spills have on the environment. The Alaskan oil spill in Prince William Sound by the Exxon Valdez in 1989, which caused significant ecological damage to the area, served as a catalyst in the institution of stricter environmental regulations for tankers and other vessels.

A U.S. law passed in 1990 required all tankers sailing in U.S. waters to be equipped with double hulls to prevent spills if the outer hull was damaged. The shipping industry claimed that another rule included in the act could shut down the shipping industry in U.S. waters. The rule required carriers to provide environmental-liability guarantees in the form of insurance, letters of credit, surety bonds, or Protection and Indemnity (P&I) clubs that insured more than 95 percent of the ships traveling in U.S. waters. However, the liability allowed was open-ended, making it impossible to find guarantors. This rule was not implemented pending resolution of the problem.

Although the number of oceangoing vessels dramatically decreased, fleet productivity, in terms of cargo-carrying capacity, improved 42 percent since 1972. The last operating differential subsidy (ODS) contract expired in 2001. In 1999 three companies still held ODS contracts that covered seven vessels in the bulk trades: Ocean Chemical Carriers, Ocean Chemical Transport, and Liberty Maritime. Under the 1996 Maritime Security Program, which had replaced ODS, 47 U.S. flag vessels remained as participants. Companies that were awarded MSP agreements included American Roll-On Roll-Off Carrier, American Ship Management, Central Gulf Lines, Farrell Lines, First American Bulk Carriers, and Waterman Steamship Lines.

The economic boom of the mid-1990s caused many ship owners to replace their aging vessels with new vessels delivered 18 to 24 months later, just when the market plummeted. The Baltic Freight index dropped and Japanese steel production dropped 13 million tons between 1998 and 1999. Seaborne trade in chemical products dropped 1 percent in 1998, and U.S. petrochemical shipments to the Far East dropped 18 percent. Although domestic business was booming, the Far East crisis left many owners of new vessels "all dressed up with nowhere to go." Consequently, in 1998 demolition of older vessels increased as owners attempted to avoid continued financial losses. The biggest demolition efforts in 1998 were in the Handy size (20/49,999 deadweight) of vessels that were 20 to 25 years old.

During the early years of the first decade of the 2000s, companies engaged in the deep sea foreign transportation of freight contended with a number of different challenges. While reduced levels of consumer and corporate spending, as well as lower production levels, affected shipment volumes, concerns over security and labor issues also plagued the industry. In the wake of a sluggish economic climate, made worse by the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, conditions were especially bleak for carriers operating routes in the North Atlantic. In 2001 and 2002, these companies struggled with dangerously low shipping rates that were taking a toll on carriers' financial health, leading to significant losses. According to Country Views Wire, the market share of member companies of the Trans Atlantic Conference Agreement decreased significantly from 1994 to 2000, falling from 70 percent to 46 percent. The Conference membership base also was on the decline, falling from 17 shipping lines in 1997 to 7 in 2001. Making matters worse was the fact that trans-Atlantic routes were stagnant compared to trans-Pacific routes that benefited from high-growth nations in regions like Asia.

Shippers on the West Coast also faced challenges. In the fall of 2002, dockworkers at 29 coastal ports staged a lockout that lasted 10 days after the International Longshore and Warehouse Union failed to come to terms with the Pacific Maritime Association. The lockout created a number of significant problems. Hundreds of ships were stranded, leading to congestion at area seaports. In addition to losses that some industry observers estimated would cost shipping companies anywhere from $400 to $600 million, the lockout had a more severe impact on the U.S. economy that reached billions of dollars.

The terrorist assault on the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen, the terrorist attacks of 2001, and the U.S.-led war against terrorism with Iraq in early 2003 all led to heightened concerns about security within the industry, as well as higher insurance rates for shipping companies. Faced with these threats, Congressional leaders and industry experts were challenged with improving security levels without causing significant shipment delays. While it appeared that at least some standing delays were imminent, the industry sought to improve security by using new technology to ensure the integrity of shipments. Among technologies being evaluated by the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of Transportation were so-called "Eseals," metal bolts embedded with radio transmission devices that sent alert signals to a central communication center to warn of any tampering.

Despite the increased demand for overseas container, bulk, and tanker shipping, the U.S. merchant marine remained a minor player in the global deep sea freight transportation industry. In 1999 CSX sold its Sea-Land global division for $800 million to Denmark's Maersk Sealand, which became the world's largest containership company, further weakening the base of U.S.-owned companies. Tanker numbers dropped during the first half of the first decade of the 2000s, falling below 100 ships for the first time in decades. Roll-on/roll-off numbers increased slightly into the low 30s, and the number of containerships held relatively steady in the low 80s.

The tanker sector of the industry was affected indirectly but dramatically on April 20, 2010, when BP's Deepwater Horizon rig operating off the coast of Louisiana exploded, killing nine people and setting in motion the worst oil spill in U.S. history. By the time the well was capped almost three months later, on July 15, the rig had dumped approximately 205 million gallons of oil into the ocean, causing an estimated $5 billion in damage to the Gulf waters, the coastline, and the livelihoods of those who relied on it. The federal government responded to the disaster by temporarily banning all off-shore oil drilling, a limitation that was gradually lifted beginning that October. However, tighter regulations were put into place in an attempt to prevent future occurrences.

The End of the First Decade of the 2000s.
In 2006 ports held four of the top seven spots as U.S. foreign trade gateways. Los Angeles was first overall with $170 billion in value of shipments ($26.3 billion export, $143.7 billion import); New York was second overall with $149.3 billion ($33.2 billion export, $116.1 billion import); Long Beach, California, was fifth overall with $134.7 billion ($21.4 billion export, $113.3 billion import), and Houston was seventh overall with $102.8 billion ($41.9 billion export, $60.9 billion import).

The international deep sea freight business was robust in the second half of the first decade of the 2000s as imports to the United States, especially from China, increased, causing significant port congestion. The Port of Los Angeles was so overwhelmed during peak seasons in 2004 that some carriers used the Panama Canal to reach the Gulf Coast or East Coast ports.

In 2007 there were 336 establishments in the industry, which employed 10,537 workers earning nearly $820 million in wages. Industry revenue exceeded $8.22 billion that year. Privately owned tanker numbers reached a low of 55 in 2008, a steep drop from the 454 in 1954.

At the end of the first decade of the 2000s, U.S. merchant ships engaged in the deep sea foreign transportation of freight carried more than 1 billion tons of cargo, reaching a high of $1.3 billion in 2008. The United States remained the world's largest trading nation, with export and import trade accounting for one-fourth of global trade. By far, the majority of this trade cargo was transported by ships. Nonetheless, the U.S. fleet's share of ocean-borne commercial foreign trade by weight was less than 5 percent. In 2007 the U.S. fleet ranked twelfth in the world in terms of transported tonnage and eighteenth in the number of oceangoing vessels, with its share of oceanborne commercial foreign trade by weight continuing to be less than 5 percent.

Current Conditions

Although this industry, like many others, struggled to recover from the global economic recession as the second decade of the twenty-first century began, by 2011 the outlook was fairly good. According to IBISWorld, "The overall economic revival will pave the way for industry growth, as demand for waterborne freight shipping´┐Żand higher fuel prices will stimulate revenue." However, the report also noted that outside competition and high start-up costs would continue to deter industry growth.

The challenges for the U.S. shipping industry were difficult, but it was hoped that increased revenues garnered from the surge in overseas activity would provide shipping companies with the capital necessary to upgrade fleets and better prepare for international competition. Tight capacity was expected to lead to price hikes in shipping charges per container or in larger contracts when they are renegotiated.

In the early 2010s, the industry remained highly concentrated, with the top 50 companies accounting for more than 90 percent of industry revenues. Although large companies benefited in terms of port access and fleet size, small companies attempted to fill niches, such as transporting unusual cargo and working out of small ports. According to Hoover's, in 2011 the transportation of shipping containers accounted for about 55 percent of all revenues, dry bulk cargo for 15 percent, and bulk liquids and gases for 15 percent. The remainder of the market comprised other services, such as transportation of vehicles and maintenance and repair.

Industry Leaders

In 2006 the world's largest and third-largest container carriers, Maersk Sealand and P&O Nedlloyd, respectively, joined forces under the banner Maersk. With U.S. headquarters in Madison, New Jersey, Maersk Inc. was part of Denmark-based A.P. Moeller-Maersk. The U.S. unit operated 500 container ships in 2010, which had a combined capacity of 3.4 million twenty-foot-equivalent units (TEU). Revenues for Maersk Inc. in 2010 were $205 million, and the firm employed 3,000 people.

Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc. (OSG), based in New York City, was a major U.S. deep sea shipping firm in the early 2010s. OSG expanded in the middle of the first decade of the 2000s when it acquired the 40-vessel fleet of Stelmar Shipping, Ltd. In 2007 the company had more than 100 international flag and U.S. flag vessels and was the second-largest publicly traded oil tanker company in the world, based on number of vessels. That year, OSG and MARAD signed the first public-private partnership under which OSG provided training opportunities for maritime academy cadets on board its international flag vessels. OSG posted more than $1 billion in revenue in 2010 with a workforce of 3,500 and a fleet of 100 vessels that together had a capacity of 11 million deadweight tons.

Other industry leaders included APL Ltd. of Scottsdale, Arizona, which supplied ocean container transportation services through its fleet of 150 ships and 4,800 employees and recorded sales of $344.7 million in 2010, and Crowley Maritime Corp. of Jacksonsville, Florida. Crowley was a family-owned company, founded in 1892. By 2011 it had more than 200 vessels, 4,500 employees, and annual sales of around $1.5 billion.

Research and Technology

Foreign shipping benefited from a revolutionary improvement first introduced in domestic transport in 1956--containerization of freight as part of an integrated transportation system. Prior to this design, cargo was lifted aboard either in separate packing crates or bundled on pallets. However, container shipping involved large containers that fit the chassis of a tractor-trailer that could be packed and sealed by the manufacturer, transported via truck to the ship terminal, removed from the truck chassis, and placed in the cargo hold of the ship with a large crane that was actually part of the ship. At its destination port, the container was lifted off the ship, placed on a truck chassis, and driven to its final destination. The containers could also be hauled by train if necessary. This innovation eliminated much of the handling that cargo once required. With this integrated system, it was handled once to pack it and once to unpack it, neither time by ship personnel, thus reducing the risk of damage and liability on the part of the ship owners.

Containerization also led to Ro/Ro (roll-on/roll-off) ships with their gigantic cargo doors on the sides and stern that allowed large vehicles or other large cargo to be driven or rolled on and off. Conversion to containerships was an expensive investment for ship owners, terminal operators, and port agencies. The adoption of containerships also led to the establishment of new companies that bought containers and leased them to the ship owners, relieving the ship owners of the complex problem of keeping track of the whereabouts of empty containers.

In the first decade of the 2000s, a number of shipping lines installed sophisticated computers and information technology to provide shippers with access to information about their cargo, keep track of rates, and allow customs officers to screen cargo while the ship is at sea.

In addition, many tanker companies were replacing their single-hulled tankers with double-hulled ships, which provided much better protection against oil spills and accidents. Under environmental regulations, use of single-hulled ships was originally scheduled to be phased out by 2015, but the time table was revised with restrictions.

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News and information about Deep Sea Foreign Transportation of Freight

Water. (Market Watch).
Logistics Management (Highlands Ranch, CO); June 1, 2002; 296 words
Average rates for shipping freight over water fell 0.9% in April. Rates for inbound deep-sea foreign transportation of freight slipped 1.8% from March to April, while outbound liner rates dipped 1.3%. Over the same one...
Logistics Management & Distribution Report; October 31, 1999; 268 words
...grew 0.7% from July to August thanks to two developments. First, the average rate for the inbound deep-sea foreign transportation of freight rose 0.6%. That doesn't sound like much, but after June's 64.1% hike, we're surprised...
Securities in registration.(Directory)
Investment Dealers' Digest; May 11, 1998; 700+ words
...212) 765-5311. * EQUITY A.C.L.N. (IPO) Location: Monaco-Pte' deac Business: Provide deep sea foreign transportation of freight services Filing Date: 12/05/97; Expected Date: To be ann.; Amount Filed: $15.0 mil; Security...
WWP-Report on Engineering Construct & Plant Operations in the Developing World; April 1, 1999; 700+ words
...NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICES (NTIS). ETG employs a total staff of about 570 involved in deep sea foreign transportation of freight. COPYRIGHT (Cr) by WWP Inc. 1999 The data contained in this report may not be reproduced, redistributed...
Market Watch.
Logistics Management & Distribution Report; June 1, 2000; 690 words
...3 +0.3 Agricultural - local 0.0 +1.7 +1.7 Water In April 2000, average prices for the deep-sea foreign transportation of freight rose 2.0% from March levels and 26.6% from year-ago figures. Domestic deep-sea transportation...
Monthly sector analysis: this sector analysis includes acquisitions and buyouts announced between 1 January 2002 and 31 January 2002, UK public offers completed between these dates are included, whereas new and pending offers are excluded, the transactions are classified according to the US sic code identifying the industry sector in which the target company is principally engaged.(Statistical Data Included)
Acquisitions Monthly; February 1, 2002; 700+ words
...Njord B Floating Havtank (NO) - Water freight (NK) - Own, operate floating services storage 4412: Deep sea foreign transportation of freight Hyundai Merchant-Port (SK) - Peninsular and Oriental Steam Shipping company (UK) - Shipping company...
Logistics Management & Distribution Report; August 1, 2001; 295 words
...are on the rise. According to data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, average prices for deep-sea foreign transportation of freight in June 2001 rose 9.2% from May levels and 8.1% from June 2000 levels. The biggest bump was recorded...
WWP-Report on Engineering Construct & Plant Operations in the Developing World; April 1, 1999; 700+ words U.S.-based ENERGY TRANSPORTATION GROUP INC. (ETG), a subsidiary of ENERGY TRANSPORTATION CORP.. According to the...of about 570 involved in deep sea foreign transportation of freight. COPYRIGHT (Cr) by WWP...

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